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Should Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Be Permitted in Actions Arising Under
the Illinois Dram Shop Act?
INTRODUCTION
For more than a century, Illinois prohibited contribution
among joint tortfeasors. 1 In 1978, the Illinois Supreme Court
abandoned the no-contribution rule with the landmark decision
1. Contribution is an apportionment of liability among culpable parties. LeMaster v.
Amsted Indus., Inc., 110 Ill. App. 3d 729, 732, 442 N.E.2d 1367, 1370 (5th Dist. 1982). See
Van Jacobs v. Parikh, 97 Ill. App. 3d 610, 612, 422 N.E.2d 979, 981 (1st Dist. 1981).
See generally Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Uniform Practice, 1938 WIS.
L. REV. 365; Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in
Products Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REv. 723 (1974); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity
Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1932); Polelle, Contribution Among Negligent
Joint Tortfeasors in Illinois: A Squeamish Damsel Comes of Age, 1 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 267
(1970); Comment, Contribution and the Distribution of Loss Among Tortfeasors, 25 AM.
U.L. REV. 203 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Loss Among Tortfeasors].
The primary purpose of contribution is to "take the sting out of the common-law rules"
that permit an injured person to sue and collect the judgment solely from whom she
pleases. Gregory, supra, at 367. For example, if a plaintiff were injured by two joint tort-
feasors, A and B, she could place the entire loss on A alone, B alone, or both A and B in
any proportion she wished. Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortfeasors,
41 S. CAL. L. REV. 728, 732 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Allocation of Loss]. See
also 1976 Illinois Judicial Conference Annual Report, Study Committee Report on
Indemnity, Third Party Actions and Equitable Contributions 198, 199-200 [hereinafter
cited as Judicial Report].
Illinois adopted the no-contribution rule in 1856. See Nelson v. Cook, 17 Ill. 443, 449
(1856). The rule was an anachronism dating back to a time when tortfeasors had been
considered criminals and had therefore not been permitted to use the courts for their own
relief. Michael & Appel, Contribution and Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors in Illinois:
A Need for Reform, 7 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 591, 592 (1976). See generally Comment, Compara-
tive Contribution: The Legislative Enactment of the Skinner Doctrine, 14 J. MAR. L. REV.
173, 173 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Comparative Contribution].
Ambiguity surrounds the term "joint tortfeasor." Historically, its meaning depended
upon the context in which it was used. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS §§ 46-47, at 291-98 (4th ed. 1971); Werner, Shared Liability: An Alternative to
the Confusion of Joint, Several, and Joint and Several Obligations, 42 ALB. L. REV. 1
(1977). In this article, joint tortfeasors means those persons whose conduct or status sub-
jects them to tort liability for the same injury. See, e.g., Van Jacobs v. Parikh, 97 Ill. App.
3d 610, 614, 422 N.E.2d 979, 982 (1st Dist. 1981).
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of Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co.2
The Illinois legislature codified the decision by enacting the Con-
tribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act (Contribution Act).3 Un-
certainty still exists, however, as to whether the Contribution
Act should be applied to all types of tort actions, or whether pub-
lic policy should bar its use in certain situations.4 In particular,
courts and commentators have questioned whether policy con-
siderations should prohibit contribution among tortfeasors in
actions arising under the Illinois Dram Shop Act.5
Five years before Illinois adopted contribution principles, the
underlying purposes of the Dram Shop Act were examined by
the Illinois Supreme Court in Wessel v. Carmi Elks Home,
Inc.6 This case asked whether a dramshop defendant could use
the doctrine of active-passive indemnity 7 to shift the entire
judgment for damages onto a drinker who has directly caused a
plaintiffs injury.8 The court held that indemnity was improper
because it would frustrate the public policy goal of disciplining
dramshop owners and operators for their indiscriminate sale of
liquor.9
This article will consider whether the policy considerations
that precluded the use of active-passive indemnity in dramshop
actions should preclude contribution as well. 10 After a brief dis-
2. 70 Il. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16, cert. denied sub nom.
Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
Skinner held that a manufacturer of a defective product who was strictly liable for the
plaintiff's injury could obtain contribution from the plaintiffs negligent employer. Id. at
16, 374 N.E.2d at 443.
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 301-305 (1981). See generally Horan, Contribution in Illi-
nois: Skinner v. Reed-Prentice and Senate Bill 308, 61 CHi. B. REC. 331 (1980); Comment,
Comparative Contribution, supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., Skinner, 70 Ill. 2d at 34-40, 374 N.E.2d at 454 (Dooley, J., dissenting);
Doyle v. Rhodes, 109 Ill. App. 3d 590, 440 N.E.2d 895 (2d Dist. 1982), case under advise-
ment, No. 57540 (Ill. Sup. Ct. May Term 1983); Appel & Michael, Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasors in Illinois: An Opportunity for Legislative and Judicial Cooperation, 10
Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 169 passim (1979).
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, 135 (1981), amended by The 1982 Revisory Act, Pub. Act.
82-783, art. 6, 3 Ill. Legis. Serv. of 1982 (eff. July 13, 1982) (amended section numbers).
See, e.g., Skinner, 70 Ill. 2d at 39, 374 N.E.2d at 454 (Dooley, J., dissenting); Appel &
Michael, supra note 4, at 185-86; Judicial Report, supra note 1, at 220.
6. Wessel v. Carmi Elks Home, Inc., 54 Ill. 2d 127, 295 N.E.2d 718 (1973).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 51-61.
8. See infra notes 63-74 and accompanying text. See generally Note, Applying Con-
cepts of Indemnification Between Active and Passive Tortfeasors to Actions Brought
Under the Illinois Dram Shop Act, 3 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 345 (1972).
9. 54 Ill. 2d at 131-32, 295 N.E.2d at 721.
10. The contribution issue in a dramshop cause may take many forms: (1) contribution
from the drinker to a dramshop keeper, see, e.g., Anderson v. Comardo, 107 Misc. 2d 821,
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cussion of the Contribution and Illinois Dram Shop Acts, ac-
tive-passive indemnity-and why its use was proscribed in dram-
shop actions-will be explained. The differences between contri-
bution and indemnity will be examined, and an analysis will
demonstrate how contribution, unlike indemnity, enhances rather
than frustrates the policies underlying the Dram Shop Act. The
analysis will also consider a troublesome fact situation that fre-
quently occurs in dramshop cases. Finally, this article will pro-
vide a brief look at how other states have dealt with the issue of
contribution in dramshop actions.
BACKGROUND
The Illinois Contribution Act
The single principle the Contribution Act endeavors to imple-
ment is that all solvent tortfeasors should be required to pay
their just share of damages.11 Founded upon the doctrine of
unjust enrichment, 12 contribution requires each tortfeasor to pay
his pro rata share of the common liability. Only a tortfeasor who
has paid more than his pro rata share has a right to contribu-
tion.13 The trier of fact apportions the pro rata shares in accor-
dance with the proportion of each tortfeasor's "relative culpabil-
ity."1 4 If one or more of the tortfeasors are judgment-proof, the
436 N.Y.S.2d 669 (Sup. Ct. 1981) and infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text; (2)
contribution from the dramshop defendant to the drinker, see, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v.
Village of Hewitt, 274 Minn. 246, 143 N.W.2d 230 (1966); (3) contribution between a thirdjoint tortfeasor and the dramshop defendant or drinker, e.g., a negligent driver who along
with the drinker contributes to the cause of an accident, see, e.g., Jones v. Fisher, 309
N.W.2d 726 (Minn. 1981); and (4) contribution between dramshop defendants inter se, see,
e.g., Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 161 N.W.2d 657 (1968) and infra notes
125-28 and accompanying text. This article will pay particular attention to the analysis
of the situation described in (1) since it appears to present the greatest challenge to the
policy considerations underlying the Act and is the issue presented in Wessel.
11. Jensvold, supra note 1, at 374. As Dean Prosser observed with respect to the
underlying rationale:
There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden
of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be
shouldered onto one alone, according to the accident of a successful levy of execu-
tion, the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiffs whim or spite, or his col-
lusion with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scot free.
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 50, at 307, quoted in Skinner, 70 Ill. 2d at 13, 374 N.E.2d at
442.
12. Chicago Bar Assoc. Civil Practice Comm., Legislative History to S.308, 81st Gen.
Assembly, 1979 Sess. at 2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History to S.308] (avail-
able at Chicago Bar Association).
13. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70, 302(b) (1981).
14. Id. 303. The term "relative culpability" is very flexible. It avoids the semantic
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remaining tortfeasors are responsible for the uncollected amount
in proportion to their pro rata liability. 15 A claim for contribu-
tion is separate and distinct from the tort action that gave rise to
liability.16
The Contribution Act encourages settlements and joinder of
actions.17 Any potential defendant who settles in good faith 8
difficulties of its forerunner "comparative negligence" by encompassing more than
simply negligence. Horan, supra note 3, at 337. Traditional negligence notions of compar-
ing fault are inapplicable to strict liability actions. For example, Skinner involved a
strictly liable manufacturer seeking contribution from the negligent employer. The court
apportioned the damages according to the relative degree each tortfeasor contributed to
the cause of the plaintiffs injuries. 70 Ill. 2d at 16, 374 N.E.2d at 443. As one commenta-
tor has explained, "relative culpability" is a term of art. The intent is that it will be
understood in its broadest sense, encompassing any casual relationship that the tortfea-
sor's status or conduct had to the injury. Horan, supra note 3, at 337.
Most of the current analysis of this subject is in the context of products liability. But as
pointed out by some commentators, "Many of the problems created by the use of compar-
ative negligence in dramshop actions will be similar to those difficulties in application of
comparative negligence to products liability law." Haggland, Muscoplat & Parrington,
Developments in Minnesota Liquor Liability Law, 34 No. 6 BENCH & B. OF MINN. 31, 47
(1977). See generally Jensvold, supra note 1, at 725-39; Kionka, Comparative Negligence
Comes to Illinois, 70 ILL B.J. 16, 18 (1981); Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault
- The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. RE. 373, 376-79 (1978); Comment,
Comparative Contribution and Strict Tort Liability: A Proposed Reconciliation, 13
CREIGHTON L. REV. 889, 891 (1980); Comment, Comparative Contribution, supra note 1, at
190-92.
15. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70, 303 (1981).
16. "[Tlhe right to contribution... creates a separate right of restitution rather than a
derivative right .... Doyle v. Rhodes, 109 Ill. App. 3d 590, 592, 440 N.E.2d 895, 897 (2d
Dist. 1982), case under advisement, No. 57540 (Ill. Sup. Ct. May Term 1983); see Wirth v.
City of Highland Park, 102 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 1081, 430 N.E.2d 236, 242 (2d Dist. 1981);
Horan, supra note 3, at 332-33 (right to contribution is a new cause of action, separate
from that giving rise to an immunity claim). A tortfeasor may seek contribution by coun-
terclaim, third-party impleader, or by a separate action. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70, 305
(1981). The party seeking to enforce his right to contribution must commence his action
within two years of the time he has paid more than his pro rata share. Id. ch. 83, 15.2.
17. Horan, supra note 3, at 332.
With respect to joinder of actions, contribution often prevents duplication of trials
because economic considerations make it desirable to resolve both the victim's claim for
relief and the tortfeasor's claim for contribution in the same action. Thus, contribution
potentially reduces the number of situations in which the plaintiff sues one joint tortfea-
sor and in a separate action sues another. Comment, Loss Among Tortfeaors, supra note
1, at 226.
18. Good faith means an honest, lawful intent, or acting without intent to assist in
fraudulent or otherwise unlawful schemes. Crouch v. First Nat'l Bank, 156 Ill. 342, 357,
40 N.E. 974, 979 (1895). For a discussion of good faith settlements in relation to the Con-
tribution Act, see LeMaster v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 110 Ill. App. 3d 729, 734-36, 442 N.E.2d
1367, 1372 (5th Dist. 1982) (settlement agreement between the plaintiff and his employer
lacked consideration and thus failed to be a good faith settlement that would bar a claim
against the employer for contribution). See generally Comment, Comparative Contribu-
tion, supra note 1, at 186-87.
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discharges her liability to pay contribution. 19 If the terms of the
settlement provide for the release of any other tortfeasor, the set-
tling party has a right to contribution from those released.
20
The broadly worded language of the Contribution Act evidences
an intent to include every type of tortfeasor within the purview
of its provisions.21 The Act provides simply that if two or more
persons are subject to liability in tort for the same injury, "there
is then a right of contribution among them ... ,"22 The legisla-
tion created no exceptions to this broad language, despite recom-
mendations from the bar to do so. For example, the original bill,
drafted by the Chicago and Illinois Bar Associations,23
expressly excluded intentional tortfeasors. 24 The legislature de-
leted this provision. 25
Nothing in the language of the Contribution Act prevents the
courts from acknowledging contribution rights in every type of
tort action.26 Nevertheless, the courts may create an exception
19. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 70, 302(d) (1981). See, e.g., Van Jacobs v. Parikh, 97 Il. App.
3d 610, 611-12, 422 N.E.2d 979, 980-81 (1st Dist. 1981) (settlement amount reduces plain-
tiffs recovery against other tortfeasors).
20. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, 302(e) (1981). If an insurer discharges a tortfeasor's obli-
gation, the insurer is subrogated to that tortfeator's right to contribution. Id. 302(f).
21. See Comment, Comparative Contribution, supra note 1, at 189-90.
22. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 70, 302(a) (1981).
23. Legislative History to S.308, supra note 10 (daily record House Deb., June 14, 1979)
(statement of Rep. Daniels).
24. See Legislative Synopsis & Digest, S.308, 1979 Sess., 81st Gen. Assembly at 236
[hereinafter cited as Legislative Synopsis]. See generally Horan, supra note 3, at 340-41;
Comment, Comparative Contribution, supra note 1, at 190.
The no-contribution rule was originally applied in a case involving intentional tortfea-
sors. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 50, at 305-06 (citing Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term
Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799)). Most American jurisdictions continue to
exclude contribution in situations involving intentional torts. Comment, Comparative
Contribution, supra note 1, at 189.
New York is one of the few states that extend contribution to intentional torts. See N.Y.
CIv. PRAC. R. 1401 Supplementary Practice Commentary C1401:3 (McKinney 1976). The
1976 Illinois Judicial Conference modeled its proposed contribution statute after New
York's. See infra note 27.
The English contribution statute, The Civil Liability (Contribution) Act, 1978, ch. 47
(originally enacted as the Married Women and Tortfeasors Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, ch.
30, § 6), also extends contribution to all tort actions, including intentional torts. It was
reasoned that distinctions between types of tortfeasors would only lead to uncertainties
and anomalies. Gregory, supra note 1, at 368 n.ll. See generally Note, The English Joint
Tortfeasor Act, 49 HARV. L REv. 312 (1935) (Great Britain does not have any law com-
parable to a dramshop statute).
25. See Legislative Synopsis, supra note 24, at 236. This deletion was the only sub-
stantial amendment to the bill before it was enacted into law.
26. Cf. Doyle v. Rhodes, 109 Ill. App. 3d 590, 592-94, 440 N.E.2d 895, 896-98 (2d Dist.
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for actions arising under the Dram Shop Act. That such an
exception be made was suggested by the Study Committee of the
1976 Judicial Conference. 27 This committee recommended the
adoption of a contribution statute, but advised that contribution
should not be extended to dramshop actions. It believed that the
policy considerations that preclude active-passive indemnity in
dramshop actions also should operate to deny contribution.2 8
The Illinois Dram Shop Act
The Illinois Dram Shop Act 29 provides a civil remedy for those
who have suffered an injury to their person, property, or means
of support as a result of the wrongful conduct of an intoxicated
person.30 The Act imposes liability upon dramshop operators31
1982), case under advisement, No. 57540 (Ill. Sup. Ct. May Term 1983) (discusses the
meaning of the phrase in the Contribution Act "subject to liability in tort" with respect to
a balancing approach between the policies underlying contribution and statutory
immunities).
27. Judicial Report, supra note 1, at 220. This committee researched and analyzed the
status of Illinois law on indemnity, third-party actions, and contribution. The Committee
proposed the adoption of a contribution statute similar to New York's. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
R. 1401 (McKinney 1976); Judicial Report, supra note 1, at 223.
28. Judicial Report, supra note 1 at 220. The Study Committee stated:
Strong consideration of public policy have prevented the granting of indemnity
under the Dram Shop Act. It has been stated that the public policy underlying the
Act provides a basis for the discipline of dram shop operators and owners, and
that the costs of accruing for a violation of the statute must be 'borne by those
profiting from the sale of liquor.' The Committee believes that similar public policy
considerations should prevent contribution as well and therefore recommends con-
tribution not be extended to Dram Shop Act cases.
Id.
29. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 43, 135 (1981), amended by The 1982 Revisory Act, Pub. Act.
82-783, art. 6, 3 IIl. Legis. Serv. of 1982 (eff. July 13, 1982) (amended section numbers). See
generally Matney, The Illinois Dram Shop Act: Recent Developments, 1967, U. ILL L.F.
116; Ogilvie, History and Appraisal of the Illinois Dram Shop Act, 1958 U. ILL L.F. 175;
Note, The Torts of the Intoxicated: Who Should Be Liable? 15 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
33 (1979); Note, Illinois Legislative Review - The Illinois Dram Shop Act: The Effect of
the 1971 Amendment, 1974 U. ILL L.F. 466 [hereinafter cited as Note, Amendment];
Symposium, Actions Under the Illinois Dram Shop Act, 1958 U. ILL L.F. 173.
30. The Act provides two theories of recovery: the "by" theory and the "in conse-
quence" theory. Any person injured in person or in property by the direct act of the
drinker can recover up to $15,000. All persons injured in their means of support, either by
the direct act of the drinker or in consequence thereof, can recover, as a class, up to the
aggregate limit of $20,000. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 43, 135 (1981). See Note, Amendment,
supra note 29, at 467.
A common type of injury to person or property or means of support results from
alcohol-related automobile accidents. Comment, Tort Liability for Suppliers of Alcohol, 44
Mo. L. REv. 757, 757 (1979). Injuries also often result from shootings or beatings by bellig-
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and the owners of the property upon which the dramshop is sit-
uated. 32 An operator of a dramshop incurs liability merely upon
proof that she directly sold or gave the liquor that caused the
wrongdoer's intoxication.33 An owner of the dramshop property
incurs liability merely upon a showing that she knew liquor was
sold on her property.34 The liability of either owner or operator
erent drinkers. J. APPLEMAN, ILLINOIS DRAM SHOP BRIEFS at xx (2d ed. 1960). See also
JURY VERDIcT RESEARCH, INc., 3A PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOK RESEARCH
REPORTS: DRAMSHOP Sun's 421-38 (1981) (of the 121 cases studied: 63 involved assault and
battery, 32 involved auto accidents).
"Support" means all those resources from which necessities and comforts of living are,
or may be, supplied. Weiner v. Trasatti, 19 111. App. 3d 240, 246, 311 N.E.2d 313, 319 (1st
Dist. 1974). Loss of support damages occur if a wage earner is rendered incapable of
providing at least some amount of support to the plaintiff. In this situation, the wage
earner can be, and often is, the drinker who has injured herself or is unable to function
normally due to habitual intoxication. J. APPLEMAN, supra, at xxii.
The Act does not provide a cause of action for the drinker herself. Bennett v. Audito-
rium Bldg. Corp., 299 Ill. App. 139, 19 N.E.2d 626 (1st Dist. 1939); Buntin v. Hutton, 206
Ill. App. 194 (4th Dist. 1917). Nor can anyone recover "who actively contributes to or
procures the intoxication of the inebriate." (This is referred to as "complicity.") Nelson v.
Araiza, 69 Ill. 2d 534, 372 N.E.2d 637 (1978). See generally Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d 1112
(1969). In addition, no one who provokes the drinker can recover. Bowman v. O'Brien, 303
Ill. App. 630, 25 N.E.2d 544 (1st Dist. 1940). Otherwise, contributory negligence is not a
defense in a dramshop action. Krotzer v. Drinka, 344 Ill. App. 256, 100 N.E.2d 518 (2d
Dist. 1951). Whether contributory negligence will reduce the plaintiffs recovery now that
Illinois, in Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981), has adopted comparative
negligence principles is an issue closely analogous to the topic of this article. See gener-
ally Haggland, Muscoplat & Parrington, supra note 14, at 46-48.
31. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 43, 135 (1981). See Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 235, 20 N.E. 73,
75 (1889). Originally, a "dram shop" was a place where spiritous liquors were sold to the
public in quantities less than one gallon. See South Shore Club v. People, 228 Ill. 75, 81
N.E. 85 (1907). However, the term "dramshop operator," or "dramshop keeper," has come
to mean anyone engaged in the liquor trade for profit. See generally Voelker, Parties to
Dram Shop Actions, 1958 U. ILL LF. 202, 214-16. In Cruse v. Aden, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the Act does not apply to a social host who furnishes alcohol to his
guests. But cf. Stanner, Liability of a Social Host for Off Premises Negligence of
Inebriated Guest, 68 ILL. B.J. 396 (1980) (discussing a recent case in which the trial court
recognized a common law negligence claim against a social host).
32. ILL Rv. STAT. ch. 43, 135 (1981). See Gibbons v. Cannaven, 393 Ill. 376, 66
N.E.2d 370 (1946); Wanack v. Michels, 215 111. 87, 74 N.E. 84 (1905).
33. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 43, 135 (1981). The courts generally have required that the
sale or gift be directly to the drinker who causes the harm, even though this requirement
is not specified in the statute. See discussion and cases cited in Welch v. Convenient Food
Mart #550, 106 Ill. App. 3d 131, 435 N.E.2d 894 (4th Dist. 1982).
For Dram Shop Act purposes, a person is intoxicated if "as a result of drinking alco-
holic liquor there is an impairment of his mental or physical faculties so as to diminish
his ability to think and act with ordinary care." ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTiON,
CIVIL, No. 150.15 (2d ed. 1971). See generally Note, Amendment, supra note 29, at 475.
34. Eggars v. Hardwick, 155 Ill. App. 254 (4th Dist. 1910). Most lessors, realizing the
dangers involved when they lease to a dramshop keeper, usually require the lessee to
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has no relation to the amount of care each may have exercised. 35
The Act grants a cause of action unknown at common law.36 At
common law, the dramshop keeper could not be found liable for
negligence because the act of drinking the liquor was considered
the sole proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.37 In Illinois,
this view was abolished when the legislature enacted the first
dramshop statute in 1871 in response to the demand of the then-
widespread temperance movement.38 That act remains the sole
remedy against dramshop owners and operators.39 The current
statute provides a ceiling for the amount of damages recoverable:
$15,000 for each person injured in person or property, and $20,000
in the aggregate for all persons injured in means of support
because of an injury to their mutual provider.40 These liability
limitations, first imposed in 1949, have never been raised.41
carry liability insurance protecting both the dramshop keeper and lessor jointly. Com-
ment, Lessor's Liability Under Dram Shop Act, 3 DE PAUL L. REV. 111, 116 (1953).
35. Cunningham v. Brown, 22 Ill. 2d 23, 26, 174 N.E.2d 153, 155 (1961). See generally
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 81, at 538.
The requirements necesary to plead a prima facie case against a dramshop defendant
are discussed in Appleman, Pleading, Evidence and Procedure Under the Dram Shop
Act, 1958 U. ILL LF. 219, 224-28.
36. Schulte v. Schleeper, 210 M1. 357,71 N.E. 325(1904).
37. Cunningham v. Brown, 22 Ill. 2d 23, 174 N.E.2d 153 (1961). See Matney, supra
note 29, at 121; Moran, Theories of Liability Actions Under the Illinois Dram Shop Act,
1958 U. ILL L.F. 191, 192; Note, The Illinois Dram Shop Act and the Common Law: A
Continuing Drama, 5 J. MAR J. PRAC. & PRoc. 342, 344 (1972).
For states that do recognize a common law action against a dramshop keeper, see
Annot., 97 A.L.R.2D 528 (1964); Note, A Common Law Cause of Action for the Injured
Inebriate?, 31 DRAKE L. REV. 435 (1981); Note, Beyond the Dram Shop Act: Imposition of
Common Law Liability on Purveyors of Liquor, 63 IOWA L. REv. 1282 (1978); Comment,
supra note 30.
38. Ogilvie, supra note 29, at 176. Similar dramshop laws were passed in a number of
states at that time. Id. at 176. For a list of present day states with dramshop laws, see
infra note 119.
39. Pearce v. St. John, 22 Ill. 2d 412, 176 N.E.2d 794 (1961); Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d
73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961); Cunningham v. Brown, 22 il. 2d 23, 174 N.E.2d 153 (1961).
40. ILL REV. SWAT. ch. 43, 135 (1981). See Moran v. Katsinas, 16 Ill. 2d 169, 157
N.E.2d 38, 71 A.L.R.2D 1108 (1959). See also Edinburn v. Riggins, 13 Ill. App. 3d 830, 301
N.E.2d 132 (3d Dist. 1973) (dependents entitled to recover $40,000 for loss of support when
two providers who supported those dependents were incapacitated). If contribution were
allowed in dramshop actions, the dramshop defendant would be jointly responsbile for
injuries to persons, property, or means of support only up to the liability limitations of the
Act. For a good analysis of the mechanics of applying contribution in dramshop actions,
along with examples of jury instructions and special verdicts, see Jones v. Fisher, 309
N.W.2d 726, 730-33 & nn. 6, 9 (Minn. 1981).
41. ILL REV. SAT. ch. 43, 135 (1947), as amended, 1949, Aug. 10, Laws 1949, 816 § 1.
This amendment also removed the provision for exemplary damages. But see Kimes v.
Trapp, 52 11. App. 2d 422, 202 N.E.2d 42 (3d Dist. 1964) (exemplary damages allowed).
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Illinois and jurisdictions with similar dramshop statutes42 have
repeatedly struggled with the question of whether such statutes
should be characterized as primarily remedial or penal.43 How
this question is answered critically influences how these statutes
are construed. If the statutes are intended primarily to punish
violators, then they should be considered penal and, as such,
construed strictly.44 If, however, the statutes are intended pri-
marily to provide an additional means of relief for an injured
plaintiff, then they should be considered remedial and construed
liberally. 45 In Illinois, the question of strict or liberal construc-
42. See infra note 122.
43. For Illinois, see Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949). See generally
J. APPLEMAN, supra note 30, at ixx; Ogilvie, supra note 29, at 181-82; Note, supra note 8,
passim. For other jurisdictions, see generally 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 562
(1969); Note, Liability Under the Minnesota Civil Damage Act, 46 MINN. L. REV. 169,
170-71 (1961).
It is generally agreed that the purposes of the several dramshop statutes are to protect
the health, safety, and welfare of the public through careful regulation of the distribution
of liquor, to discipline the dramshop defendant, and to compensate any person injured as
a result of the sale of liquor. But the courts do not agree on the primary nature of dram-
shop statutes. Id. at 170.
The word "penal," as applied to statutes, has many shades of meaning. Strictly speak-
ing, penal statutes impose a punishment for an offense committed against the state,
which the executive of the state has the power to pardon. Common usage, however, has
enlarged this meaning to include all statutes that command or prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violations and even those that, without expressly prohibiting
certain acts, impose a penalty on their commission. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 389 (1953). See
Salzman v. Boeing, 304 Ill. App. 405, 412, 26 N.E.2d 696, 699 (1st Dist. 1940); see generally
Kutner, Judicial Identification of "Penal Laws" in the Conflict of Laws, 31 OKLA. L. REv.
590, 622-25 (1978).
A remedial statute is one that remedies defects in the common law or in civil jurispru-
dence generally. M.H. Vestal Co. v. Robertson, 277 Ill. 425, 429, 115 N.E. 629, 631 (1917).
In this respect, the Dram Shop Act is remedial because, in abrogation of the common
law, it grants an additional remedy to the injured party.
44. Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889). "The Dram Shop Act now under
consideration is a statute of a highly penal character, and provides rights of action
unknown to the common law, and should, according to well understood canons, receive a
strict construction." Id. at 239, 20 N.E. at 77.
To construe a statute strictly means to limit it to such subjects and applications as are
obviously within its terms and purposes. Bismark Hotel Co. v. Petriko, 21 Ill. 2d 481, 486,
173 N.E.2d 509, 512 (1961); Lawton v. Sweitzer, 354 Ill. 620, 624, 188 N.E. 811, 813 (1934).
The strict construction of the statute should be in favor of persons subjected to its opera-
tion. United Cork Cos. v. Volland, 365 Ill. 564, 7 N.E.2d 301 (1937). Wessel, 54 Ill. 2d at
137, 295 N.E.2d at 724 (Ward, J., dissenting); Cf. People v. Hardt, 329 Ill. App. 153, 156, 67
N.E.2d 487, 489 (1946), error dismissed, 395 111. 552, 70 N.E.2d 577 (1947).
In addition to penal statutes, a statute creating a new liability unknown at common
law should also be strictly construed. See Pack v. Sporleder, 327 Il1. App. 420, 425, 64
N.E.2d 674, 676 (3d Dist. 1945).
45. To construe a statute liberally means to interpret it broadly to effectuate the pur-
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tion is further complicated because the Dram Shop Act consti-
tutes part of the Liquor Control Act of 1934,46 which expressly
provides that it must be liberally construed. 47 In Howlett v.
Doglio, 48 the Illinois Supreme Court, held that the Dram Shop
Act is both penal and remedial.49 Arguably, then the construc-
tion should depend on the issue before the court: the Act should
be strictly construed whenever the penal aspect is involved, and
liberally construed whenever necessary to "suppress the mischief
and advance the remedy."50
Active-Passive Indemnity
Illinois courts developed the doctrine of active-passive indem-
nity to mitigate the harsh effects of the no-contribution rule.51 The
doctrine attempted to place the ultimate responsibility for dam-
ages upon the party whose conduct or status was the "primary"
or "active" cause of the plaintiffs injury. Where indemnity was
found appropriate, the indemnitee could shift all his liability to
the indemnitor. Because the terms "active" and "passive" were
never precisely defined, however, no general rule was ever devel-
oped as to when indemnity would be allowed.52 The Illinois
pose and spirit behind the statute. Zehender & Factor v. Murphy, 386 1l. 258, 263, 53
N.E.2d 944, 947 (1944).
46. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 43, 94-194 (1981).
47. Id. 94. "This Act shall be liberally construed, to the end that the health, safety
and welfare of the People ... shall be protected .... Id..
.48. 402 Ill. 311, 318, 83 N.E.2d 708, 712; Annot., 6 A.L.R.2D 790, 795 (1949).
49. For a discussion of statutes that are both remedial and penal, see ILL L. & PRAC.,
Statutes § 174 (1976).
50. Howlett, 402 Ill. at 318, 83 N.E.2d at 712. That the characterization of a dramshop
statute as being either penal or remedial should depend on the nature of the issue before
the court was suggested by Judge Blackmun (now Justice Blackmun) in Village of
Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284, 292 (8th Cir. 1961).
51. The courts have recognized three types of indemnity: (1) indemnity based on a
pre-tort contract in which one party promises to recompense the other for any liability the
indemnitee may incur, (2) indemnity based on a relationship between the tortfeasors, e.g.,
if an employer is hable under a theory of respondeat superior, he is entitled to indemnity
from the employee who caused the injury; and (3) active-passive indemnity based on a
qualitative distinction between the tortfeasors' wrongful conduct. Ferrini, The Evolution
from Indemnity to Contribution -A Question of the Future, If Any, of Indemnity, 59 CHI.
B. REc. 254, 254-56 (1978).
52. See Bua, Third Party Practice in Illinois: Express and Implied Indemnity, 25 DE
PAuL L. REv. 287, 300-07 (1967). See generally Michael & Appel, supra note 1, at 595.
Prosser did not even attempt to define the doctrine and simply generalized that the
duty to indemnify will be recognized in cases where community opinions would consider
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Supreme Court said "active" and "passive" were terms of art to
be "worked out" by courts of review on a case-by-case basis.5 3
Initially, courts granted indemnity only to an innocent party54
who had some sort of pre-tort legal relationship with the other
tortfeasor. 55 However, the inequities of the no-contribution rule
gradually led the courts to expand the active-passive doctrine. 56
"[T]rapped in the dilemma of trying to operate with the clumsy
remedy of indemnity,"57 some courts stretched the definition of
an "innocent party" to a point where a negligent party was
allowed indemnity from a party whose conduct established a
greater degree of culpability for the injury.5 Other courts expand-
ed the doctrine by relaxing the pre-tort legal relationship re-
quirement.5 9
Before the courts began to relax these requirements, indemnity
had not been permitted in dramshop actions because the dram-
shop defendant had not been considered an innocent party nor
had she a pre-tort legal relationship with the drinker.60 Once the
courts began to relax these requirements, however, it was not
long before the Illinios Supreme Court was forced to consider the
appropriateness of indemnification under the Dram Shop Act.61
Indemnity and the Dram Shop Act
The court confronted the issue in Wessel v. Carmi Elks Home,
Inc.,6 2 where the vendee became intoxicated in the dramshop
that, in justice, the responsibility should rest upon one rather than another because of a
significant difference in the kind or quality of their conduct. W. PROSSER, supra note 1,
§ 52, at 313.
53. Moody v. Chicago Transit Auth., 17 Ill. App. 3d 113, 117, 307 N.E.2d 789, 792-93
(1974).
54. Note, supra note 8, at 351. An "innocent" party is one whose liability is merely
derivative, stemming from a legal technicality like respondeat superior or from a statu-
tory tort. See Bua, supra note 52, at 296.
55. See Bua, supra note 52, at 296-300.
56. Polelle, supra note 1, at 279.
57. Id.
58. See Wessel v. Carmi Elks Home, Inc., 54 Ill. 2d 127, 130, 295 N.E.2d 718, 720 (1973)
(citing Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 86 Ill. App. 2d 187, 229 N.E.2d 769 (1st Dist.
1967)).
59. See Bua, supra note 52, at 296-99.
60. Coffey v. ABC Liquor Stores, Inc., 13 111. App. 2d 510, 514, 142 N.E.2d 705,707 (4th
Dist. 1957). See generally Note, supra note 8, at 351.
61. Note, supra note 8, at 351-53.
62. 54 IlI. 2d 127, 295 N.E.2d 718(1973).
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defendant's bar. While intoxicated, he drove his car into the side
of a house, killing one occupant, injuring another, and causing
extensive property damage. The dramshop defendant filed a
third-party complaint for indemnity against the vendee on the
theory that the vendee was the active and primary cause of the
injury.63
The Illinois Supreme Court, resolving a split between the
appellate courts,64 held that, as a matter of law, dramshop defend-
ants may not seek indemnity from the drinker. 65 The court
stated that the decisions that had relaxed the requirements for
allowing active-passive indemnity did not control here because
those cases had dealt with common law negligence, not statutory
liability as in a dramshop action.66 A dramshop action, the court
said, was sui generis, and policy considerations were of substan-
tial importance.67
The court found the policy underlying the Dram Shop Act
penal in nature and concluded that indemnity could not be per-
63. Id. at 128-29, 295 N.E.2d at 719.
64. The issue of indemnity in dramshop cases divided the Illinois appellate courts.
Compare Walker v. Service Liquor Store, Inc., 120 Ill. App. 2d 112, 255 N.E.2d 613 (4th
Dist. 1970) and Geocaris v. Bangs, 91 Ill. App. 2d 81, 234 N.E.2d 17 (1st Dist. 1968)
(indemnity allowed) with Wessel v. Carmi Elks Home, Inc., 133 Ill. App. 2d 902, 272
N.E.2d 416 (5th Dist. 1971), aff'd, 54 Ill. 2d 127, 295 N.E.2d 718 (1973) and Coffey v. ABC
Liquor Stores, Inc., 13 Ill. App. 2d 510, 142 N.E.2d 705 (4th Dist. 1957) (indemnity denied).
See generally Note, supra note 8, at 354-57. Cf. Earp v. Lilly, 217 Ill. 582, 75 N.E. 552
(1905) and Schwer v. Badalamenti, 14 Ill. App. 2d 128, 134-36, 143 N.E.2d 558,561-62 (4th
Dist. 1957) (jury may not apportion damages between dramshop defendants).
65. Wessel, 54 Ill. 2d at 133, 295 N.E.2d at 721. Wessel dealt with whether a dramshop
defendant could obtain indemnity from the intoxicated tortfeasor. A subsequent appellate
case, Harden v. Desideri, 20 Ill. App. 3d 590, 315 N.E.2d 235 (1st Dist. 1974), applied the
reasoning of Wessel to deny a dramshop owner indemnity, under active-passive
indemnity principles, from the dramshop operator-lessee.
See also Scheff v. The Homestretch, Inc., 60 Ill. App. 3d 424, 428, 377 N.E.2d 305, 307-08
(3d Dist. 1978) (following Wessel, the court denied dramshop operator's right to indemnity
from a drinker despite patron's written contract of indemnification).
66. Wessel, 54 Ill. 2d at 130-31, 295 N.E.2d at 720. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Davis emphasized that the Dram Shop Act imposes a form of strict liability which
simply could not be characterized as either active or passive negligence. He added that it
would therefore be unreasonable to weigh the dramshop defendant's liability against the
liability of the drinker for purposes of indemnity. Id. at 133-34, 295 N.E.2d at 722 (Davis,
J., concurring).
Interestingly, in denying indemnity, Justice Davis stated, "We should not permit the
ultimate responsibility for the sale or gift of... liquor to be minimized qualitatively by
the conduct of the intoxicated person." Id. at 134, 295 N.E.2d at 722 (emphasis added).
This statement apparently left the door open to allow contribution, which distinguishes
liability quantitatively as opposed to qualitatively like active-passive indemnity.
67. Id. at 131, 295 N.E.2d at 720.
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mitted without frustrating that policy.68 The court stated that
indemnity was improper for two reasons. First, indemnity would
defeat the purpose of dramshop liability, which is to discipline
dramshop keepers for their "indiscriminate sale of liquor and the
evils resulting therefrom." Second, indemnity would frustrate the
legislative intent, evidenced by the Act itself, that the burden for
a violation of the Act be borne ultimately by those who reap the
profits from the sale of liquor.69
In a strong dissent, Justice Ward emphasized the remedial
aspect of the statute and downplayed its penal character. Draw-
ing a comparison to the Structural Work Act,70 under which
actions for indemnity had been permitted, Justice Ward argued
that the Dram Shop Act was intended to provide an additional
remedy for a plaintiff who could not recover full damages from
the drinker. He added that, although the Act could be loosely
characterized as penal because it imposed a strict liability not
found under common law, this penal nature justified resolving
doubtful matters of construction in favor of those held liable
under the Act.71
68. Id. at 131-32, 295 N.E.2d at 720-21. As evidence of the Act's penal nature, the court
referred to both the preamble to the Liquor Control Act, see supra notes 46-47 and accom-
panying text, and the liability limitations within the Dram Shop Act, see supra notes
40-41 and accompanying text. Apparently, the majority believed that the ceiling on dam-
ages indicated the legislature intended the damages to act more as a penalty against
dramshop defendants than as an additional remedy for the injured person.
69. Wessel, 54 Ill. 2d at 131-32, 295 N.E.2d at 721. See also Lichter v. Scher, 11 Ill. App.
2d 441, 138 N.E.2d 66 (1st Dist. 1956), in which the court stated that the Act is to disci-
pline and regulate a "legal but ill-favored trade."
The direct discipline on the dram shop operators and owners, originally effected by
making them liable to the injured party, has now given way to an indirect disci-
pline whereby the fear of losing insurance, or of prohibitive premiums, is a substan-
tial motive for careful operation and leasing of [dram shops].
Dworak v. Tempel, 17 Ill. 2d 181,191, 161 N.E.2d 258, 264 (1959).
An operator who has been, or may be, indiscriminate in selling alcohol, and an owner
who is careless about leasing her premises for dramshop use, are poor insurance risks,
and without insurance, the risks of the liquor trade under the Act are too great. Thus, the
fear of losing, or failing to obtain, insurance is a substantial motive for careful operation
and leasing. Standard Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, 19 Ill. App. 2d 319, 326, 152 N.E.2d
500, 504 (1st Dist. 1958). See generally Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post #2665, 97 Ill.
App. 2d 139, 143, 239 N.E.2d 856, 858 (2d Dist. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 43 Ill. 2d
1, 248 N.E.2d 657 (1969); Ogilvie, supra note 29, at 185.
70. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 60-69 (1981). For a discussion of contribution under the
Structural Work Act, see LeMaster v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 110 Ill. App. 3d 729, 442 N.E.2d
1367 (5th Dist. 1982) (contribution allowed).
71. 54 Ill. 2d at 136-37, 295 N.E.2d at 724 (Ward, J., dissenting) (citing Freese v. Tripp,
70 Ill. 496 (1873); Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889); Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill.
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ANALYSIS
Contribution vs. Indemnity
Now that Illinois has abandoned the no-contribution rule, Illi-
nois courts must eventually determine whether the policies pre-
cluding indemnity in dramshop actions should also bar contri-
bution.7 2 The following analysis will show that permitting contrib-
ution in dramshop actions will not conflict with the policies
underlying the Dram Shop Act.
The Illinois Supreme Court has emphasized the important dis-
tinction between contribution and indemnity: contribution dis-
tributes the loss among tortfeasors in accordance with each
defendant's relative culpability, while indemnity shifts the entire
loss from one tortfeasor to another.7 3 Although both doctrines
relate liability to culpability, contribution is often suitable in
situations where indemnity would be inappropriate.7 4
The "all or nothing" objective7 5 of indemnity has no place
where the conduct of each tortfeasor plays a part in causing the
injury. Only under a rule of contribution does each defendant's
obligation spring from her own conduct, apart from the liability
of any other defendant.7 6 Under the active-passive doctrine, the
decision to grant indemnity was, in effect, a choice between
shifting the cost of damages to a defendant largely at fault or
allowing the entire loss to rest upon a defendant who was only
slightly culpable.7 7 In a dramshop action neither choice is satis-
factory. To allow the dramshop defendant to shift the entire
burden would defeat the penal policy of the statute; on the other
hand, to force the dramshop defendant to pay for the part of the
loss that the drinker should rightfully bear would frustrate
311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949). Penal statutes should be construed strictly in favor of those
subject to their liability. See supra note 44.
72. Of course, the issue may never reach the appellate courts, unless the legislature
removes or raises the liability limitations contained in the Dram Shop Act. In today's
inflated economy, the relatively low ceiling on the Act's damages may not warrant the
litigation costs involved in an appeal. However, because dramshop actions are extremely
common in Illinois, the contribution issue will engender considerable interest at the trial
level.
73. Skinner, 70 Ill. 2d at 7, 374 N.E.2d at 442.
74. Polelle, supra note 1, at 268.
75. See Appel & Michael, supra note 4, at 170.
76. Van Jacobs v. Parikh, 97 Ill. App. 3d 610,612, 422 N.E.2d 979, 981 (1st Dist. 1981).
77. Jensvold, supra note 1, at 737.
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equitable and tort law principles. 78 Contribution, unlike indem-
nity, would not force a choice between these mutually exclusive
alternatives. One defendant would not escape her obligation
merely because another was forced to bear her part of the loss.
A more subtle difference between indemnity and contribution
is that indemnity fosters rigidity where contribution permits
flexibility. In theory, defendants' tortious conduct should be
labeled active or passive based on particular factual circumstan-
ces. In reality, however, once particular types of conduct have
been labeled as such, courts tend to dispense with individual fac-
tual evaluations and apply the labels to later cases involving
essentially the same form of conduct.7 9 Accordingly, if the Wes-
sel court had determined that the dramshop defendant's conduct
had been merely passive, entitling her to indemnity, then dram-
shop keepers could have expected indemnification in future
dramshop actions.80 This result would have diminished the dis-
ciplinary purpose of the Act by decreasing the liquor trade's risk
of liability without increasing its incentive to exercise more care.
Contribution, in contrast, would have no such effect. It would
permit the factfinder to compare culpability on a sliding scale,
measuring liability according to the conduct of each particular
defendant on a case-by-case basis.
Contribution fulfills a fundamental goal of tort law: that each
person should pay for the consequences of her own torts.81 In a
dramshop action, both the drinker and the dramshop defendant
should share the liability-the drinker because tort policy requires
it, the dramshop defendant because Dram Shop Act policy
requires it. Contribution ensures that the requirements of both
policies are fulfilled.8 2
78. See id. at 734. Tort law attempts to achieve four principal purposes: (1) to provide
compensation to the injured; (2) to allocate the costs of the injury so as to deter future
injuries and promote safety; (3) to promote efficiency in providing compensation to the
victim; and (4) to satisfy the popular sense of equity. Ashford & Johnson, Negligence vs.
No-Fault Liability: An Analysis of the Workers' Compensation Example, 12 SETON HALL
L.REv. 725 (1982). See generally Leflar, supra note 1, at 136-37; Williams, The Aims of the
Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 137 (1951); Comment, Contribution and
Indemnity in California, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 490,495 (1969).
79. See Wessel v. Carmi Elks Home, Inc., 133 Ill. App. 2d 902, 272 N.E.2d 416 (5th
Dist. 1971), aff'd, 54 Ill. 2d 127, 295 N.E.2d 718 (1973).
80. Id.
81. See Jensvold, supra note 1, at 734.
82. The alternative is to continue to let the plaintiff choose her defendants at whim.
This, in effect, is a de facto delegation of responsibility to the plaintiff to carry out the
policies underlying tort law and the Dram Shop Act. Objectives other than the fulfillment
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Contribution's Effect on the Penal Purpose of the Act
The disciplinary purpose of the Dram Shop Act seeks to
encourage careful conduct on the part of dramshop owners and
operators.8 3 To be an effective means of regulating behavior,
discipline must be administered consistently. That is, it must be
applied when it is deserved and in the amount it is deserved.8 4
Contribution will help satisfy both these requirements.
Contribution will ensure that dramshop keepers do not escape
liability.8 5 If, for example, there is more than one potentially lia-
ble dramshop keeper, and a plaintiff chooses to sue only one,
contribution will allow impleader of the other keepers.86 If a
plaintiff chooses to sue only the drinker, contribution will permit
the drinker to implead any of the dramshop keepers. 87 Contribu-
of public policy, of course, motivate the plaintiff. In fact, as frequently noted, a dramshop
action creates many situations in which collusion may well occur.
[N]othing... prevents a victim [from recovering]... from the intoxicated person
... directly, so query, why should the law prevent.., a victim from recovering
indirectly from the intoxicated person. To bar such indirect recovery opens the door
to a certain cooperation between the intoxicated person and his victim which may
amount to collusion and fraud, with the dram shop owner and his tenant suffering
for the sins of the intoxicated person ... for his original indiscretion and guilt.
Wessel v. Carmi Elks Home, Inc., 133 Ill. App. 2d 902, 908-09, 272 N.E.2d 416, 422 (1971)
(Eberspacher, P.J., dissenting), affl'd, 54 Ill. 2d 127, 295 N.E.2d 718 (1973). See also J.
APPLEMAN, supra note 30, at 222; Ogilvie, supra note 29, at 183.
83. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
84. See van der Haag, Punishment as a Device for Controlling the Crime Rate, 33
RUTGERS L. REv. 706, 711-14 (1981). Although most studies about discipline deal with
criminal sanctions, the penal objectives of tort damages are substantially the same-
punishment and deterrence. See Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Ill. 2d 31, 35,
330 N.E.2d 509, 511 (1975) (discussing punitive damages in a wrongful death action).
85. It is widely believed that the certainty of liability, not the magnitude, has the
greatest effect on deterring undesired conduct. Comment, Loss Among Tortfeasors, supra
note 1, at 212; Note, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 45 HARV. L. REv.
349, 354 n.28 (1931); Comment, Allocation of Loss, supra note 1, at 730; cf. Andenaes, The
General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949, 964 (1966). The possi-
bility of escaping all liability-a "sporting chance" of a type traditionally appealing to
wrongdoers as a class-might cause many to be more, rather than less, willing to engage
in the wrongful activity. Leflar, supra note 1, at 133. See also Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co.,
281 Minn. 417, 423, 161 N.W.2d 657,660 (1968); Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 274 N.W.2d 79,
83 (Minn 1978).
86. See Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 161 N.W.2d 657 (1968) (discussed
infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text).
Illinois' Dram Shop Act evinces a policy that both the operator and the owner of the
dramshop should have the responsibility to see that careful conduct is employed. Contri-
bution will implement this policy by making more certain both are held liable for any
violations.
87. The drinker was not permitted indemnity from the dramshop defendant under the
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tion may also encourage drinkers-who are in the best position
to prevent intoxication-to assume a heightened sense of respon-
sibility for their own behavior since they, too, will be unable to
escape liability.88
By increasing the certainty of discipline, contribution will
increase the dramshop keeper's incentive to act carefully. By
apportioning damages according to culpability, contribution will
increase that incentive even further. This is because, with con-
tribution, careful conduct on the part of the dramshop keeper will
not only reduce the incidence of liability, it will also, in many
cases, reduce the amount of her liability should an injury
unavoidably occur.89
Once the dramshop keeper is subjected to liability, the policy
considerations of the Dram Shop Act are satisfied and ordinary
active-passive indemnity doctrine. See McDonald v. Trampf, 49 Ill. App. 2d 106, 198
N.E.2d 537 (1st Dist. 1964); Economy Auto Ins. Co. v. Brown, 334 Ill. App. 579, 79 N.E.2d
854 (2d Dist. 1948). If the courts prohibit contribution rights to dramshop keepers because
of the penal nature of the Dram Shop Act, then, to be consistent, they should also deny
such rights to the drinker. A penal structure must be construed strictly in favor of those
subject to its liability. See supra note 44.
88. Cf. Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d 430, 629 P.2d 8, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500 ( 1981).
89. Some examples of factors that the factfinder could use to measure the dramshop
defendant's careful conduct, i.e., relative culpability, are as follows: (1) The extent that the
dramshop keeper encouraged the inebriate to consume alcohol: Did she sponsor, for
example, happy hours, minimum drink cover charges, or sale prices for package liquor?
Did the dramshop keeper make any effort to prevent the intoxication? (2) The economic
gains from the particular sale and from sales of liquor generally; (3) The extent the
defendant was justified in relying on her patron to exercise proper care: Did the patron
show physical signs of the influence of liquor? Should the defendant have realized the
drinker was a minor? (4) The extent that the likelihood and magnitude of the "evil"
resulting from the intoxication was foreseeable: Did the defendant furnish one drink or
ten? Was the dramshop located where it was often frequented by motorists? (5) The like-
lihood of injury not occurring at all in the absence of the defendant's actions.
These factors could also be used to measure a dramshop lessor's culpability insofar as
the lessor knew of, or could have reasonably foreseen, their existence. Cf. Jensvold, supra
note 1, at 742 (suggesting analogous criteria to adjudge culpability of a strictly liable but
"faultless" product liability defendant); Note, Connecticut Law-Dram Shops: Third
Party Recovery for Reckless and Wanton Misconduct . Kowal v. Hofher, 3 W. NEW ENG.
L. REv. 769 (1981) (enumerating factors relevant to the measurement of culpability of the
reckless dramshop defendant).
The use of these and other possible factors can only produce an approximate assess-
ment of the dramshop defendant's culpability in relation to that of the drinker or other
dramshop defendants. The application of contribution in any tort action is always impre-
cise and inherently broad. But, as evidenced by Skinner and the Contribution Act, such
an assessment, representing the judgment of the community as embodied in the jury, is
far better than no assessment at all. This balancing process does not inject negligence
principles into the dramshop action. The dramshop defendant is still strictly liable to the
plaintiff. The above factors would only be taken into consideration in the action for con-
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principles of contribution may apply.90 This same reasoning
was applied to the regulatory policy behind the strict product
liability in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machin-
ery Co.91 The policy underlying strict product liability is identi-
cal to the Dram Shop Act regulatory policy cited in Wessel: that
the cost of the injury should be imposed upon those who create
the risk and reap the profits.92 In Skinner, the Illinois Supreme
Court determined that contribution does not conflict with this
policy objective of strict product liability. The court recognized
that contribution is a separate action, arising only after the
defendant has borne the costs of the underlying claim.93 Since
Skinner held that contribution does not conflict with the regula-
tory policy of imposing the economic loss on the party that
created the risk, the courts should likewise hold that contribution
does not conflict with the regulatory policy of the Dram Shop
Act. In fact, by ensuring that all culpable dramshop keepers are
joined, contribution may actually enhance that policy by spread-
ing the loss throughout the liquor industry. Moreover, the legis-
lative history of the Contribution Act and its all-encompassing
language demonstrate an intent to make contribution available
to all types of tortfeasors.94 Thus, any uncertainty as to the suit-
ability of contribution in a particular setting should be re-
solved in favor of allowing contribution.
tribution, which is distinct from the dramshop action. See infra notes 90-94 and accom-
panying text.
90. Cf. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 14, 374 N.E.2d
437, 443 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16, cert. denied sub nom. Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v.
Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Rovekamp v. Central Constr.
Co., 45 Ill. App. 2d 441, 449, 195 N.E.2d 756, 760 (1st Dist. 1964) (strict liability purpose of
Structural Work Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 60-69 (1981), is accomplished once liability
is imposed, but then costs of liability may be transferred).
91. 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16 cert. denied sub noma.
Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978). Prior
to the abrogation of the no-contribution rule, courts denied indemnity to defendant manu-
facturers. See Burke v. Illinois Power Co., 57 Ill. App. 3d 498, 373 N.E.2d 1354 (1st Dist.
1978); Kossifos v. Louden Mach. Co., 22 Ill. App. 3d 587, 592, 317 N.E.2d 749, 752 (1st
Dist. 1974); Stanfield v. Medalist Indus., 17 Ill. App. 3d 996, 309 N.E.2d 104 (2d Dist.
1974). But cf. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 338 N.E.2d
857 (indemnity allowed, but only to a downstream seller, not to the manufacturer).
92. Compare Skinner, 70 Ill. 2d at 14, 374 N.E.2d at 443 with Wessel, 54 Ill. 2d at 132,
295 N.E.2d, at 721.
93. The right to contribution is not created by the tort, but by the satisfaction of thejudgment. Comment, Loss Among Tortfeasors, supra note 1, at 213. See also Wirth v.
City of Highland Park, 102 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 1081, 430 N.E.2d 236, 242 (2d Dist. 1981).
94. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
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Contribution and the Remedial Purpose of the Act
Contribution only affects the rights of the tortfeasors; it does
not affect the substantive rights of the plaintiff.95 The plaintiff
retains the right to determine from whom she wishes to receive
her judgment. Nevertheless, two issues arise if the plaintiff hap-
pens to be the drinker's spouse or dependent. First, there is the
issue whether interspousal or parent-child immunity bars the
dramshop defendant's right to contribution.96 Second, there is
the issue whether the drinker must pay contribution if the plaintiff-
dependent's damages result from the drinker's loss of support.97
The immunity issue, which affects tort actions generally, has
apparently been resolved by the Illinois appellate courts. In two
recent cases courts rejected immunity defenses and upheld the
right to contribution: one case affected the plaintiffs spouse, and
the other, the plaintiffs parent.98
The second issue presents a problem unique to dramshop
actions. Oftentimes, the drinker will be the one who suffers the
injury or becomes incapacitated by alcoholism, in which case,
one or more of her dependents may bring a dramshop action for
loss of her support. Under these circumstances, it would be
absurd to require contribution from the drinker because that
would simply increase her inability to provide support.
The Minnesota Supreme Court faced this very issue in Asche-
man v. Village of Hancock.99 Here, the wife and daughter of a
drinker who injured himself in a one-car accident sued the vil-
lage, as operator of a municipal bar, for loss of support damages.
The village sought contribution from the drinker, contending
that he shared a "common liability" with the village for the
damages incurred. 100 The village argued that common liability
95. ILL. REV. SWAT. ch. 70, 304 (1981).
96. For the Illinois statute that deals with interspousal immunity, see Ill. Rev. Stat.
ch. 40, 1001 (1981). For a discussion of the common-law rule regarding parent-child
immunity, see Larson v. Bushkamp, 105 Ill. App. 3d 965, 435 N.E.2d 221 (2d Dist. 1982).
97. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
98. Larson v. Buschkamp, 105 Ill. App. 3d 965, 435 N.E.2d 221 (2d Dist. 1982); Wirth v.
City of Highland Park, 102 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 430 N.E.2d 236 (2d Dist. 1981). See generally
Hertz, The Tort Triangle: Contribution From Defendants Whom Plaintiff Cannot Sue, 32
ME. L. REv. 83, 118-20 (1980).
99. 254 N.W.2d 382 (Minn. 1977). See infra notes 121-33 and accompanying text for a
discussion of contribution under Minnesota's dramshop law.
100. Minnesota, like many other states, has injected a "common liability" require-
ment into its contribution rule. Hertz, supra note 98, at 100. The term "common liability"
almost defines itself. It simply means that in order for a tortfeasor to obtain contribution
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existed because recent Minnesota cases had overruled the tradi-
tional doctrine of intrafamilial immunity.10 1 The village premised
liability upon the theory that the wife and daughter could bring
a direct action against the drinker for the loss of support which
resulted from his negligence. 10 2 The court, however, identified a
flaw in that theory by pointing out that the elimination of intra-
familial immunity defenses did not create a new cause of action
or a new tort. 0 3 The court acknowledged that state law imposes
a duty on a husband to provide support, but the existence of that
duty does not grant to a dependent a cause of action against a
husband who negligently injures himself. Because the plaintiffs
had no cause of action against the drinker, the court held that no
common liability existed and consequently dismissed the third-
party complaint.104
Similarly, the Illinois Contribution Act grants a right to con-
tribution only when the wrongdoers are "subject to liability in
tort" for the same injury. 05 Like Minnesota, Illinois does not
recognize a tort cause of action for negligently failing to provide
support. 0 6 Therefore, regardless of the absence of intrafamilial
immunity defenses, 0 7 a dependent has no direct action in tort
for loss of support against the drinker. In sum, granting a dram-
shop defendant a right to contribution in such cases not only
would produce an absurdly circuitous result and diminish the
remedial purpose of the Dram Shop Act, but also would violate
from another wrongdoer, that wrongdoer must be liable to the plaintiff at the instant the
tort is committed. Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 145, 241 N.W.2d 641, 643
(1976). If the one from whom contribution is sought was not liable to the person harmed
at the time of the injury, there is no basis for contribution. See also Jensvold, supra note
1, at 726.
101. Ascheman, 254 N.W.2d at 384.
102. Id. at 384.
103. Id. (citing Plain v. Plain, 307 Minn. 399, 240 N.W.2d 330 (1976), which held that a
husband could not recover damages from his wife for loss of her consortium resulting
when she negligently injured herself).
104. Id. Accord Conde v. City of Spring Lake Park, 290 N.W.2d 164 (Minn. 1980).
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 302 (1981). See supra text accompanying note 22.
106. Although Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 40, 1101 (1981) creates liability for one who,
"without lawful excuse," fails to support a spouse or child, the spouse or child cannot
bring an action in tort because 1101 is a criminal statute (notwithstanding the power of
the court to direct the fine be paid to the defendant). People v. Flury, 173 Ill. App. 640 (1st
Dist. 1912). Paragraph 1101 does provide a civil remedy, but only to the Department of
Public Aid for the value of any assistance it had to provide to the dependent as a result of
the spouse's breach of duty. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 40, 1101 (1981) (citing The Illinois Public
Aid Code, Act of April 11, 1967, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 23, 1-1 (1981)).
107. See supra note 99-101 and accompanying text.
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the Contribution Act which requires that defendants be liable in
tort to the plaintiff.
As a final point, it should be noted that with its unrealistically
low damage provisions, the Illinois Dram Shop Act very often
fails to fulfill either its penal or its remedial purpose. With
respect to the penal aspect, the statutory ceiling for damages
sometimes serves to immunize rather than punish the dramshop
keeper, who might otherwise have to bear a larger part of the
actual damages for a particularly serious injury. With respect to
the remedial purpose, the liability limitations often leave a grie-
vously injured plaintiff without any means of suitable relief if
she were so unfortunate as to be injured by an uninsured or oth-
erwise insolvent drinker.
If contribution is permitted in dramshop actions, it may encour-
age the legislature to raise the statutory damages ceiling to a
more realistic level. The present limitations likely have persisted
because of the fear that, with the incidence of dramshop liability
being so common, imposition of actual damages would place an
intolerable burden on dramshop keepers who are liable on a no-
fault basis.108 Under a contribution scheme, this specter of un-
limited, no-fault liability should vanish because damages would
be apportioned according to culpability only. The dramshop
defendant would be required to bear more than her pro rata
share only if the injured plaintiff had no other means of recov-
ery. This result would seem to be more in accord with the reme-
dial and penal purposes of the Dram Shop Act.
CONTRIBUTION AND DRAMSHOP ACTIONS
IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Fourteen states currently have dramshop laws (also known as
"civil damage acts") similar to Illinois' statute.10 9 Only two of
these states, Minnesota and New York, have law relatively
108. See Stanner, supra note 31, at 404. Connecticut, which forbids contribution
between tortfeasors of any kind, is the only state with statutory damages as low as Illi-
nois' ($25,000). See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975). See also Lavierin v.
Ulysses, 180 A. 2d 632 (Conn. 1966).
109. ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-103 (1973); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 30-102 (West 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 123.92 to 123.94 (West. Supp. 1982-83); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1964); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (1982-83); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West. Supp. 1982); N.Y. GEN. OBAIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978 &
Supp. 1982-83); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Page
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settled as to the issue of contribution in dramshop actions.110
Minnesota apparently grants a right of contribution to all the
1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-497 (Purdon 1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-11-1 (1976); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 32-11-1 (Smith Interim Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972). See
generally Lousberg, Dram Shop Litigation, in 12 AM. JUR.TRIALS 733 (1966); Note, Torts
of the Intoxicated: Who Should be Liable? 15 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs., 33, 34-35 (1979).
110. See, e.g., Annot., 31 A.L.R.3D 438 (1970 & Supp. 1982) A reason for the scarcity
of case law on this subject may be that many states have only recently abrogated the
no-contribution rule. See generally UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 12
U.L.A. 63 (West Supp. 1982); H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT-THE NEGLGENCE CASE,
Apps. 421 (1978 & Supp. 1982). A few states, for example, Connecticut and Alabama, still
adhere to the rule. H. WOODS, supra, at 450, 421. Furthermore, one state, Utah, did not
even have a dramshop law until 1981. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-11-1 (Smith Interim
Supp. 1981).
Iowa has only dealt with two aspects of the contribution issue: whether a drinker can
obtain contribution from a dramshop keeper, and whether dramshop keepers may obtain
contribution inter se. With respect to the latter, see League v. Ehmke, 120 Iowa 464, 94
N.W. 938 (1903) (court stated each vendor should only be liable for a pro rata share of
damages resulting from the drinker's habitual intoxication). As to whether a drinker may
obtain contribution from the dramshop defendant, Iowa law is unclear. The Iowa legisla-
ture seems to have overreacted to a dubious decision of the Iowa Supreme Court in which
the drinker's insurer was allowed to obtain contribution for injuries suffered by the
drinker himself. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunkelberger, 172 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa
1969). This decision was tantamount to allowing the inebriate a cause of action under the
dramshop statute for his own injuries. After the decision, the legislature added a provi-
sion to the dramshop statute, Iowa Code Ann. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1982-83), barring
contribution to the drinker's insurer from the dramshop defendant even though an inno-
cent third person, not the drinker, suffered the injury the insurer recompensed. IOWA
CODE ANN. § 123.94 (West Supp. 1982-83). See Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Mumert, 212 N.W.2d
436 (Iowa 1973). But cf. Shasteen v. Sojka, 269 N.W.2d 48 (Iowa 1977).
Maine recently faced the issue whether a dramshop defendant could obtain contribu-
tion. In Winchenback v. Steak House, Inc., 430 A.2d 45, (Me. 1982), the trial court had
held that the dramshop defendant was not precluded from seeking contribution from the
drinker. Id. at 46. Because of procedural deficiencies, however, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine discharged the case without discussing the contribution issue.
Michigan law regarding contribution is far from settled. It is clear, however, that dram-
shop defendants inter se have a right to contribution. Duncan v. Beres, 15 Mich. App.
318, 166 N.W.2d 678 (1968). See also Friend v. Campbell, 102 Mich. App. 278, 301 N.W.2d
503, 507 (1981) (stating that Michigan law is well settled on this issue). As to contribution
rights between the drinker and the vendor (in both directions), however, Michigan law is
confused. Prior to 1970, contribution between any types of tortfeasors was permitted only
if their liability was premised on the same tort theory of liability. See id. at 505. Accord-
ingly, contribution was denied when one tortfeasor was liable under the dramshop law,
and the other under common law negligence. See Reno v. Heineman, 56 Mich. App. 509,
224 N.W.2d 687 (1974); Virgilio v. Hartfield, 4 Mich. App. 582, 145 N.W.2d 367 (1966).
Then, in 1970, the Michigan Supreme Court apparently abandoned the "common theory"
rule and held that an equitable right to contribution belongs to all but intentional wrong-
doers. See Moyses v. Spartan Asphalt Paving Co., 383 Mich. 314, 174 N.W.2d 797 (1970).
Three years after Moyses, the Sixth Circuit recognized a right of contribution between a
dramshop defendant and a drinker. Frank v. Voris, 503 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1974) (constru-
ing Michigan law). The Sixth Circuit held that Moyses superseded Virgilio, which had
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possible defendants in dramshop actions.11' With the decision in
denied a vendor the right to contribution from the drinker. But then, in Putney v. Gibson,
94 Mich. App. 466, 289 N.W.2d 837 (1979), rev'd sub nom. Putney v. Haskins, 414 Mich.
181, 324 N.W.2d 729 (1982), a panel of the Michigan Appellate Court denied a dramshop
keeper the right to set off a sum the plaintiff had received in settlement from the drinker.
Putney ignored both Moyses and Frank, and cited Virgilio as authority for the rule that
no right of contribution exists between the dramshop defendant and the drinker because
they are not liable under the same tort theory. Id. at 842, 845. Putney was recently re-
versed, however, in Putney v. Haskins, 414 Mich. 181, 324 N.W.2d 729 (1982) (court did
not discuss the set-off issue). To further complicate the situation, before Putney was re-
versed, another appellate court cited it as controlling law and held that neither a drinker
nor a dramshop defendant may seek contribution from each other. See Friend v. Camp-
bell, 102 Mich. App. 278, 301 N.W.2d 503, 506 (1980).
Whether or not Michigan courts prohibit vendor-drinker contribution, a unique provi-
sion in Michigan's dramshop statute rectifies some of the evils that arise when contribu-
tion is not available. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (West Supp. 1982-83). Called
the "name and retain" provision, it requires the plaintiff, in an action against a dram-
shop vendor, to name the drinker as a codefendant and retain her in the action until the
trial is completely over or until the dramshop defendant settles with the plaintiff. The
provision eliminates the common practice whereby the drinker enters into a settlement
with the injured plaintiff for a token sum and thereafter energetically assists the plain-
tiffs action against the defendant tavern owner. Sales v. Clements, 309 Mich. 103, 108-09,
247 N.W.2d 889, 891 (1976) (quoting 57 Mich. App. 367, 372, 26 N.W.2d 101, 104 (1975)).
See generally Annual Survey of Michigan Law, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 629, 630 (1976).
North Dakota has yet to face the issue of contribution under its dramshop law. How-
ever, in Feuerheim v. Ertell, 286 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1979), the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that North Dakota's comparative negligence statute, N.D. Cent. Code § 9-10-
07 (Smith 1975), would not apply to dramshop actions. The decision dealt with the plain-
tiffs contributory negligence, but the very broad language of the decision seemingly elim-
inated the possibility of contribution as well.
Pennsylvania has no law regarding this subject. In Dick v. Lambert, 472 F. Supp. 560
(M.D. Pa. 1979), the issue was whether a dramshop defendant has a right to contribution
from the drinker, but the federal court dismissed the case because Pennsylvania law was
not applicable.
111. Generally, the Minnesota dramshop statute, Civil Damage Act, Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 340.95 (West Supp. 1982), is comparable to that of Illinois. Village of Brooten v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284, 294-95 (8th Cir. 1961). The Minnesota statute grants a right of
action to any person injured in person, property, or means of support as a result of the
wrongful conduct of a drinker. It imposes strict liabiltiy upon dramshop operators who
contribute to the intoxication by making an "illegal" sale. See Dahl v. Northwestern
Nat'l Bank, 265 Minn. 216, 121 N.W.2d 321 (1963). Although the statute does not define
an "illegal" sale, the courts have interpreted it to mean a sale to a minor or an "obviously
intoxicated" person. See Seeley v. Sobczak, 281 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1979); Strand v. Vil-
lage of Watson, 245 Minn. 414, 72 N.W.2d 609 (1955); see generally Haggland, Muscoplat
& Parrington, supra note 14, at 33-36; Note, Liability Under the Minnesota Civil Damage
Act, 46 MINN. L. REv. 169, 185-88, 193-95 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Note, Liability]. Like
Illinois, Minnesota has limited the amount of liability to which a vendor can be sub-
jected. In 1977, the Minnesota legislature imposed a ceiling on the amount of damages
recoverable under the statute: $250,000 for each person injured and a $500,000 aggregate
per accident. Civil Damage Act, 1977 Minn. Laws ch. 390, § 1.
For discussions of the various aspects of the Minnesota statute, see generally Com-
ment, Abandonment of Notice Requirement in Third-Party Claims for Contribution
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Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 112 Minnesota became the first state
to expressly grant contribution rights to dramshop defendants
inter se.113 In Skaja, the court discussed whether contribution
would "best effectuate the policy objectives" of its dramshop sta-
tute. 114 The court found that contribution would further those
objectives by increasing the incentive for liquor vendors to do
everything in their power to avoid liability and by spreading the
burden of economic loss more equitably throughout the liquor
industry. 115
Minnesota has also left no doubt that a drinker may seek con-
tribution from a dramshop keeper. 16 Similarly, there is every
Under Civil Damage Act: Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 64 MINN. L. REv. 863 (1980); Note,
Joint Tortfeasors: Contribution-No Intentional Wrongdoing Inference from Strict Lia-
bility Statute, 53 MINN. L. REv. 1089 (1969); [hereinafter cited as Note, Inference]; Note,
Liability, supra; Note, Contribution and Indemnity-An Examination of the Upheaval in
Minnesota Tort Loss Allocation Concepts, 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 109 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Upheavel].
112. 281 Minn. 417, 161 N.W.2d 657 (1968). See also Hammerschmidt v. Moore, 274,
N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1978).
113. See Skaja, 281 Minn. at 420, 161 N.W.2d at 659. To do so, not only did the
supreme court have to rebut the theory that contribution would defeat the penal aspect of
the statute, but the court also had to modify a Minnesota common law presumption that
a violator of a statute is guilty of an intentional tort and thus barred from contribution.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Christenson, 183 Minn. 182, 186, 236 N.W. 618, 619 (1931). See
Note, Inference, infra note 111, at 1089; Note, Upheaval, infra note 111, at 120-123.
An early Illinois case, Wanack v. Michels, 215 Ill. 87, 74 N.E. 84 (1905) (dramshop case),
also declared that a violation of a statute is an intentional tort. This aspect of Wanack,
however, essentially has been ignored and is considered obsolete. See Wessel v. Carmi
Elks Home, Inc., 133 Ill. App. 2d 902, 907-08, 272 N.E.2d 416, 421 (5th Dist. 1971) (Eber-
spacher, P.J., dissenting), aff'd, 54 Ill. 2d 127, 295 N.E.2d 718 (1973).
114. Civil Damage Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1982). See Skaja, 281
Minn. at 422, 161 N.W.2d at 660-61. Like Illinois, Minnesota has vacillated over how the
statute should be construed, sometimes declaring it to be "highly penal," Beck v. Groe,
245 Minn. 28, 34, 70 N.W.2d 778, 891 (1955), and other times declaring it to be remedial in
character Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 436, 57 N.W.2d 254, 261 (1953). See
generally Village of Brooten v. Cudahy Packaging Co., 291 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1961).
115. Skaja, 281 Minn. at 422,161 N.W.2d at 661.
116. Beginning with Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Village of Hewitt, 274 Minn. 246, 143
N.W.2d 230 (1966), a string of Minnesota Supreme Court cases have reiterated that a
right to contribution belongs to the drinker (or his insurer). Fitzer v. Bloom, 253 N.W.2d
395 (Minn. 1977); Reserve Ins. Co. v. Village of Big Lake, 304 Minn. 148, 230 N.W.2d 47
(1975); Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Village of Rose Creek, 302 Minn. 282, 225 N.W.2d 6
(1974). Similarly, on the rare occasion when a third person, along with the dramshop
keeper and the drinker, contributes to the cause of the injury, that third tortfeasor also
has a right to contribution from the dramshop keeper. See, e.g., Jones v. Fisher, 309
N.W.2d 726 (Minn. 1981). In Jones, the drinker was a negligent pedestrian who was
struck and killed by a negligent motorist. After the motorist settled with the decedent's
spouse for wrongful death, the motorist was allowed contribution from the dramshop
keeper to the extent that the wrongful death settlement comprised damages for loss of
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indication that the converse-contribution from a drinker to a
dramshop keeper-is also permitted. For example, in Ascheman
v. Village of Hancock,117 discussed above, it was presumed that
dramshop keepers, in general, have a right to contribution from
the drinker. The only reason why the court did not require the
drinker to pay contribution in that case was because the injured
plaintiffs were the drinker's wife and daughter. 118 The most
compelling evidence that Minnesota recognizes a dramshop
keeper's right to contribution from a drinker is contained in the
Minnesota Civil Damage Act'1 9 itself. In 1977, the legislature
amended the Civil Damage Act by incorporating by reference
section 604.01 of the Minnesota Statutes. 20 At that time, section
604.01 embodied Minnesota's contribution rule. 21 The amend-
ment stipulated that section 604.01 should apply, i.e., contribu-
tion should be permitted, except in cases brought by a dependent
of the drinker. 122 The exception reflects the supreme court's hold-
ing in Ascheman,1 23 while making clear that the legislature
support. See id. at 731 nn.6 & 9, for examples of jury instructions on damage allocation.
See also Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Clayton Club, 316 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. 1982)
(following Jones).
117. 254 N.W.2d 382 (Minn. 1977). See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
118. But see Conde v. City of Spring Lake, 290 N.W.2d 164 (Minn. 1980). The Conde
court faced exactly the same issue as the Ascheman court and denied contribution, stat-
ing it was following Ascheman. But the Conde opinion includes some dicta that would
seem to cast doubt upon whether a dramshop keeper may seek contribution even if the
plaintiff is not a dependent of the drinker. Attributing the following statement to Skaja,
the court said, "Imposing liability on the vendors and not allowing contribution from the
intoxicated person acts as an incentive to the vendors to avoid illegal sales. Skaja v.
Andrews Hotel Co ...... Id. at 166. The Skaja opinion, however, contains no such
statement.
119. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1982).
120. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1976) (current version at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 to
§ 604.05 (West Supp. 1982)).
See Civil Damage Act, 1977 Minn. Laws ch. 390 § 1. See generally Haggland, Musco-
plat & Parrington, supra, note 14.
The legislative practice of using so-called "reference statutes" to incorporate existing
statutes is a generally recognized method of legislation. The result is that the reference to
the other statute constitutes, in effect, a reenactment of that statute as it stands at the
time when it is incorporated by reference. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 70 (1953).
121. Kraft, The North Dakota Equity for Tortfeasors Struggle, 56 N. DAK. L. REv. 67,
73 (1980).
122. "Actions for damages based upon liability imposed by this [dramshop statute]
shall be governed by section 604.01. [However] section 604.01 ... [shall not be applicable]
to actions.., brought by a . .. dependent of an intoxicated person." MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 340.95 (West Supp. 1982).
123. Jones v. Fisher, 309 N.W.2d 726, 731 n.7 (Minn. 1981). For a discussion of
Ascheman, see supra, notes 102.07 and accompanying text. Actually, the exception goes
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intends that a dramshop defendant should otherwise be permit-
ted to obtain contribution from the drinker.
New York, like Minnesota, has relatively settled law on the
subject of contribution in dramshop actions. 124 As in Illinois, the
New York courts have alternately characterized their dramshop
statute as penal and remedial.125 One court, emphasizing the
penal aspect of the statute, went so far as to say that the provi-
sion for (actual and exemplary) damages was comparable to a
"civil fine."'126 New York also had developed a doctrine of ac-
tive-passive indemnity, but, as in Illinois, the courts had refused
to apply the doctrine to dramshop actions. 127
Since 1973, when New York adopted a general rule permitting
contribution among tortfeasors, 28 the courts have granted con-
tribution rights whenever, and in whatever context, the issue
arises in dramshop actions. In Rubel v. Stakrow,129 the court
found there was no basis in logic or policy for refusing to extend
contribution rights to dramshop keepers inter se. 30 In Weiss v.
Muller,'31 the court acknowledged the right of a drinker to receive
contribution from a dramshop defendant. In Wood v. City of
farther than Ascheman. Strictly construed, it would prohibit contribution not only for
damages from loss of support, but also for damages from injury to person or property-
damages that Ascheman's holding does not apply to.
124. New York's dramshop statute, N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 11-101 (McKinney 1978 &
Supp. 1982-83), is generally the same as that of Illinois except in two respects. First, New
York's statute provides for exemplary damages and places no limitations on actual dam-
ages. Second, New York only imposes strict liability if the dramshop keeper makes a sale
to a minor or an actually and apparently intoxicated person. See Bohner, Some Practical
Aspects of Dram Shop Litigation, 51 N.Y. ST. B.J. 286, 287 (1979). See also McNally v.
Addis, 65 Misc. 2d 204, 317 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1970). This standard of culpability is much
more strict than that of Illinois.
125. N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1982-1983). See also
Anderson v. Comardo, 107 Misc. 2d 821, 826, 436 N.Y.S.2d 669, 672 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
126. Playford v. Perich, 2 Misc. 2d 170, 172, 152 N.Y.S.2d 201, 203 (Sup. Ct. 1956). But
see Mitchell v. Shoals, Inc. 48 Misc. 2d 381, 264 N.Y.S.2d 865 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) (narrow-
ing Playford to apply only to exemplary damages).
127. See Anderson v. Comardo, 107 Misc. 2d 821, 823, 436 N.Y.S.2d 669, 671 (Sup. Ct.
1981). See generalty Note, Developments in New York Practice, 47 ST. JoHNs L. REv. 185
(1972).
128. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 282 N.E.2d 288
(1972) (now codified at N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. 1401 (McKinney 1976)).
129. 72 Misc. 2d 734, 340 N.Y.S.2d 691 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
130. "Whether the relative degree of fault should be determined on the basis of the
number of drinks procured at each establishment, or other factors, is for a jury to deter-
mine after considering all the evidence." Id. at 735, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
131. 97 Misc. 2d 7, 410 N.Y.S.2d 776 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
Contribution and the Dram Shop Act
New York, 132 the New York Appellate Division held that a
dramshop defendant is permitted to seek contribution from the
drinker. Each of these decisions, however, dealt with the issues
rather summarily, and only recently in Anderson v. Comar-
do,133 did a court extensively analyze whether, as a matter of
policy, a dramshop defendant should be able to obtain contribu-
tion from a drinker.
In Anderson, the dramshop keeper requested either indemnity
or contribution. The court denied the indemnity claim, but then
distinguished indemnity from contribution. 34 The court acknowl-
edged the possibility that a right to contribution might defeat the
intent behind certain strict liability statutes, but stated that the
right should be recognized unless it is clear that contribution
would actually produce such a detrimental effect. 135
Anderson explained that, although the dramshop statute was
motivated in part by the desire to curb intemperance, one of its
primary goals was to assure that injured persons would have an
available remedy. Punishment, the court said, could be meted out
by the imposition of exemplary damages. Anderson found that it
would be incongruous to automatically deny a right of contribu-
tion to all dramshop defendants when such a right belongs even
to intentional tortfeasors. 136
In closing, it is interesting to note that, in Anderson, the
drinker cited the Illinois decision in Wessel to support his posi-
tion that contribution should be denied. The Anderson court con-
curred with the decision in Wessel, but emphasized that Wessel
dealt only with indemnity, not with contribution. "Apparently,"
the court said, "Illinois law did not apportion liability when
Wessel was decided."' 137
CONCLUSION
The right of contribution among defendants should be recog-
nized in Illinois dramshop actions. Unlike the doctrine of indem-
132. 39 A.D.2d 534, 330 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972).
133. 107 Misc. 2d 821,436 N.Y.S.2d 669 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
134. Id. at 823, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
135. Id. at 824, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 671-72 [emphasis added] (quoting Twentieth Annual
Report of New York Judicial Conference for the Judicial Year 1974; 215-16 (1975)).
136. Id. at 828, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 674. See supra note 24.
137. Id. at 828-29, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
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nity, the rule of contribution would equitably distribute costs in
proportion to liability among dramshop keepers and drinkers. As
such, contribution would enforce both the regulatory and puni-
tive policies underlying the Illinois Dram Shop Act. Further, it
would do so without impairing the plaintiffs right to recovery,
even when the plaintiff is the spouse or the child of the drinker.
Allowing dramshop keepers a right to contribution may also
serve to encourage the Illinois legislature to raise the Dram Shop
Act's liability limitations. The equitable loss allocation of contri-
bution should eliminate the fear that dramshop keepers would be
exposed repeatedly to massive liability on a no-fault basis. A
realistic increase in the liability limitations would render the
Dram Shop Act genuinely capable of fulfilling its penal and
remedial purposes.
Finally, an examination of the laws of other jurisdictions sup-
ports the application of contribution principles to dramshop
actions in Illinois. Indeed, if the Illinois courts follow the prece-
dent set by these other jurisdictions, they would only be estab-
lishing a rule consonant with their own contribution statute
which was enacted to apply to every type of tort action and to
permit the factfinder to assign the costs of liability according to
the particular circumstances of each case.
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